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[top-politics] Re: 20060902#parlement
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05/09/06 21:41
Dance-Monkey algorithm
> > For now, I want to know about your directional Markov-algorithm for > > your V-V-V system. How does it differ from PageRank?
>ec: A participant can directly vote on issues, or can delegate his voice on each issue to someone else.This delegation is transitive, that is, his delegate can also delegate his 2 voices to another individual, who can also delegate his 3 voices to yet another one. No limit.
-M: Unlimited depth – like PageRank. But I notice that it is only one delegate per voter. Again, because there is only one, there is no ability to fork around dead ends and loops. This creates instabilities and is overly centralized compared with having multiple proxies. Well, what is your response?
>ec: One can change anytime his actions. A direct vote will, of course, override an indirect delegation.
-M: ‘of course’ – again, why the override? Why not let the voter decide if there is going to be an override or not? Maybe the voter wants both a direct vote and more than one delegate. SD2-S allows for this. How is your way better?
>ec: Thus, someone participating will have two available actions for each issue: > – +1 or -1 (this will certainly evolve in time) – delegate to someone else
-M: SD2-Smartocracy offers:
- general trustees and/or
- issue position and/or
- specific delegates and/or
- decision thresholds and/or
- deliberation thresholds
The only two that are mutually exclusive are #1 and #3. This yields about 20 different combination possibilities for the voter. How is your way better?
>ec: Some differences: > – no rank or other such silly concepts
-M: Delegates all have differing voting power relative to one another. This is rank whether it is called ‘rank’ or not. (I have said this before, and this is an uncontested point of mine.)
>ec: – direct expression override indirect one
-M: Why? If you need administrators anyway, why not just bundle them into the vote?
This would make a manditory rep vote, and with SD2-S, they would still have the option for a direct vote. (This is another uncontested point of mine.)>ec: – software won’t assign votes without human participation
-M: You aren’t comparing V-V-V with PageRank, you are now comparing V-V-V with SD2-S. Fine, this is better.
SD2-S’s Dance-Monkey algorithm will assign a rep vote only if the individual voter doesn’t select at least two manditory reps. There is still human participation here – Dance-Monkey is just looking for gaps in the rank distribution curve to fill, this rank distribution is created entirely by human participation. Without human participation, humans selecting other humans, all voters would be equal. Under this condition, Dance-Monkey would be DD.
>ec: – not tens of elements onto which to intervene for every issue
-M: A critique of user flexibility? I offer the voter 5 options.
On any issue vote, a voter selecting an issue position and one delegate would be fine.
The defaults would cover the rest.
Does anyone have a better way?shanti
Mark, Seattle WA USA
+1
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On Tue, Sep 05, 2006 at 12:41:58PM -0700, Mark wrote:
> > > For now, I want to know about your directional Markov-algorithm > > > for your V-V-V system. How does it differ from PageRank? > > > > … > > Unlimited depth – like PageRank.
That took you some time! This is transitive delegations, or delegable proxy.
> But I notice that it is only one delegate per voter.
As far as I’m concerned, it’s one delegate per issue and per voter.
I don’t see the need for more, but more could be added at the expense of simplicity.
> Again, because there is only one, there is no ability to fork around > dead ends and loops. This creates instabilities and is overly > centralized compared with having multiple proxies. Well, what is your > response?
Loops are not a problem. Everything is public and loops will be public. A loop can be broken at any moment with just one of its participants directly voting on the related issues.
Not only that but, so what if there are loops?
> > One can change anytime his actions. A direct vote will, of course, > > override an indirect delegation. > > ‘of course’ – again, why the override? Why not let the voter decide > if there is going to be an override or not? Maybe the voter wants both > a direct vote and more than one delegate. SD2-S allows for this. How is > your way better?
Because as you yourself agreed, direct expression is more potent than indirect one.
Even using indirect information, the end result is decision on issues. A direct expression on issues is more potent than an indirect one.
You agreed on that!… Well, until one paragraph later you totally made a mess of yourself and changed your mind. That was fun you know, I’m still giggling at that thought :)
> > Thus, someone participating will have two available actions for each > > issue: > > – +1 or -1 (this will certainly evolve in time) > > – delegate to someone else > > SD2-Smartocracy offers: > 1. general trustees and/or > 2. issue position and/or > 3. specific delegates and/or > 4. decision thresholds and/or > 5. deliberation thresholds > > The only two that are mutually exclusive are #1 and #3. > This yields about 20 different combination possibilities for the voter. > How is your way better?
Simplicity is better than unneeded complexity.
A general “trustee” is simply a delegate on a top issue (thus 1 == 3). Decision and deliberation thresholds are just normal issues (thus 4 and 5 are unneeded).
It’s almost fun talking to you tonight :)
> > Some differences: > > – no rank or other such silly concepts > > Delegates all have differing voting power relative to one another. > This is rank whether it is called ‘rank’ or not. (I have said this > before, and this is an uncontested point of mine.)
There will of course be differences in power between individuals, but this is not used to determine such awfully stupid and unneeded things as “directors”.
I don’t care about ranks.
> > – direct expression override indirect one > > Why? If you need administrators anyway, why not just bundle them into > the vote?
Sorry, where is coming that “if you need administrators”??? I do not need administrators!!! Parlement is a totally decentralized, P2P, system!
Every one can be an administrator. No top administrator, no “if you need administrators”!!!
> This would make a manditory rep vote, and with SD2-S, they would still > have the option for a direct vote. (This is another uncontested point > of mine.)
No mandatory rep vote. And I have said that from the beginning.
What I have in mind is a tool that allow groups of individuals to write anything they want. It could be used as full fledged parliament, or just to write a newspaper, a poem, the rules of a game.
It is in fact just slightly more than a forum. A “digg” on democratic steroids.
> Does anyone have a better way?
Yes. The one some of us describe, which rely on a mix of direct and indirect democracy, which makes sure that direct participation override indirect one, which does not require wizards to operate and which does not assign votes almost randomly to fill curves only you care about.
Not only that, but no one here will ever code your project.
You are a kid playing alone. Stop with your attitude please, and try to join the rest of the world.
(that might also mean you won’t insult your own father, calling him and the rest of humanity “lemmings”)
echarp – http://leparlement.org
+1
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> > > > For now, I want to know about your directional Markov-algorithm > > > > for your V-V-V system. How does it differ from PageRank?
> > Unlimited depth – like PageRank.
>ec: That took you some time!
-M: I already knew that you were attempting to do this, but how would you do this without an input constrained PageRank?
>ec: This is transitive delegations, or delegable proxy.
-M: OK, all the systems that I have been comparing have this. The only exceptions would be some versions of SD2, but my prefered defaults, SD2-S, would be delegable proxy.
> >M: But I notice that it is only one delegate per voter.
>ec: As far as I’m concerned, it’s one delegate per issue and per voter.
-M: The comparison was for the recieved inputs from the individual voter:
V-V-V – voter chooses a delegate OR an issue position SD2-S – voter chooses delegate(s) OR, delegate(s)-AND-issue position.>ec: I don’t see the need for more, but more could be added at the expense of simplicity.
-M: See below.
> > Again, because there is only one, there is no ability to fork around > > dead ends and loops. This creates instabilities and is overly > > centralized compared with having multiple proxies. Well, what is your > > response?
>ec: Loops are not a problem. Everything is public and loops will be public.
-M: Transparency isn’t the issue.
>ec: A loop can be broken at any moment with just one of its participants > directly voting on the related issues.
-M: Understood.
>ec: Not only that but, so what if there are loops?
-M: How are you going to calculate ranks(voting power) without a PageRank type algorithm?(You did criticise me for using PageRank. So my issue here isn’t your intentions, its your implimentation.)
> > > One can change anytime his actions. A direct vote will, of course, > > > override an indirect delegation.
> > ‘of course’ – again, why the override? Why not let the voter decide > > if there is going to be an override or not? Maybe the voter wants both > > a direct vote and more than one delegate. SD2-S allows for this. How is > > your way better?
>ec: Because as you yourself agreed, direct expression is more potent than > indirect one.
-M: What is more ‘potent’(whatever-the-fuck that is supposed to mean), direct expression OR, direct expression-and-indirect expression? By your convoluted logic my way still should be better.
>ec: Even using indirect information, the end result is decision on issues. A > direct expression on issues is more potent than an indirect one. > You agreed on that!… Well, until one paragraph later you totally made > a mess of yourself and changed your mind. That was fun you know, I’m > still giggling at that thought :)
-M: Go ahead and have fun.
> > > Thus, someone participating will have two available actions for each > > > issue: > > > – +1 or -1 (this will certainly evolve in time) > > > – delegate to someone else > > > > SD2-Smartocracy offers: > > 1. general trustees and/or > > 2. issue position and/or > > 3. specific delegates and/or > > 4. decision thresholds and/or > > 5. deliberation thresholds > > > > The only two that are mutually exclusive are #1 and #3. > > This yields about 20 different combination possibilities for the voter. > > How is your way better?
>ec: Simplicity is better than unneeded complexity.
-M: I give the option for simplicity. With SD2-S the voter gets to choose how simple or complex his/her ballot will be.
I give choice that you don’t give.>ec: A general “trustee” is simply a delegate on a top issue (thus 1 == 3). > Decision and deliberation thresholds are just normal issues (thus 4 and > 5 are unneeded).
-M: OK, this is interesting. This also appears to be a more complex than SD2-S.
And I don’t see it contradicting SD2-S, because there can be two different kind of trustees, administrative-generalists(selected by SD2-S)and ideological-generalists(selected by V-V-V.)>ec: It’s almost fun talking to you tonight :)
-M: Likewise. :-)
> > > Some differences: > > > – no rank or other such silly concepts > > > > Delegates all have differing voting power relative to one another. > > This is rank whether it is called ‘rank’ or not. (I have said this > > before, and this is an uncontested point of mine.)
>ec: There will of course be differences in power between individuals, but > this is not used to determine such awfully stupid and unneeded things as > “directors”. I don’t care about ranks.
-M: You may not care, but administrative nessecities require ranks.
> > > – direct expression override indirect one
> > Why? If you need administrators anyway, why not just bundle them into > > the vote?
>ec: Sorry, where is coming that “if you need administrators”??? I do not > need administrators!!! Parlement is a totally decentralized, P2P, > system! Every one can be an administrator. No top administrator, no “if you need > administrators”!!!
-M: I did question you about this trip. How is there a command-hierarchy in a distributed system? Emmanuel, this one appears completely bonkers to me.
Communication and command are two different things.
> > This would make a manditory rep vote, and with SD2-S, they would still > > have the option for a direct vote. (This is another uncontested point > > of mine.)
>ec: No mandatory rep vote. And I have said that from the beginning.
-M: I know you have said this. I guess if command hierarchies could be generated without having command hierarchies, this might work – no need for reps, therefore no need for manditory reps.
>ec: What I have in mind is a tool that allow groups of individuals to > write anything they want. It could be used as full fledged parliament, > or just to write a newspaper, a poem, the rules of a game. > It is in fact just slightly more than a forum. A “digg” on democratic > steroids.
-M: OK, I see Parlement and Wikis going this way, but I still don’t see the rank and command hierarchies here. It won’t work without hierarchy.
> > Does anyone have a better way?
>ec: Yes. The one some of us describe, which rely on a mix of direct and > indirect democracy, which makes sure that direct participation override > indirect one,…
-M: Mixing concepts: participation vs input. I am all for participation, but just because someone does a direct legislative input doesn’t automaticly make them a participant.
Your argument here is dependent on there being no need for top administrators – completely ‘horizontal’ administration. This hasn’t been established.
>ec: which does not require wizards to operate…
-M: SD2-S has only five input choices. This fits on a single page. No wizardry here.
>ec:…and which does not assign votes almost randomly to fill curves…
-M: This default only happens when someone doesn’t select their manditory reps.
This is just a user convienience that has the added side benefit of giving underdogs a better chance of challenging higher rank clusters.>ec:..only you care about.
-M: I am a theoretician, so I may understand things that you don’t, and therefore ‘care’ about them.
>ec: Not only that, but no one here will ever code your project.
-M: If someone doesn’t want to serve humanity, that is their problem. I’ll code it if I have to. Because of its superior theoretical basis, it will whup V-V-V. (A hybrid of V-V-V and SD2-S may be even better, SD2-S for voting, and V-V-V for information.)
>ec: You are a kid playing alone. Stop with your attitude please, and try to > join the rest of the world.
-M: I am a part of the world because I follow the rule structures that have been established by the world. Because of your violations of these rules, you have more of an attitude than me.
>ec: (that might also mean you won’t insult your own father,…
-M: Lemming = one who is willfully contradictory. My father does have this problem, but he is much better than average.
>ec: …calling him and the rest of humanity “lemmings”)
-M: ‘rest of humanity’ – no, most of humanity. Did you see my “Proof of Lemmingism” post?
Well, is it TRUE?shanti
Mark, Seattle WA USA
+1
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On Wed, Sep 06, 2006 at 01:33:03PM -0700, Mark wrote:
> > > Unlimited depth – like PageRank. > > I already knew that you were attempting to do this, but how would > you do this without an input constrained PageRank?
Please rephrase your question.
> The comparison was for the recieved inputs from the individual voter: > V-V-V – voter chooses a delegate OR an issue position > SD2-S – voter chooses delegate(s) OR, delegate(s)-AND-issue position.
Once more, please, repeat after me: users can vote and delegate at the same time on the same issue. But the direct vote overrides the delegation.
> How are you going to calculate ranks(voting power) without a PageRank > type algorithm?(You did criticise me for using PageRank. So my issue > here isn’t your intentions, its your implimentation.)
A delegate represent a given number of persons. This is his voting power.
> > Because as you yourself agreed, direct expression is more potent > > than indirect one. > > What is more ‘potent’(whatever-the-fuck that is supposed to mean), > direct expression OR, direct expression-and-indirect expression? By > your convoluted logic my way still should be better.
It’s not convoluted, and you accepted it: direct expression is more meaningful than indirect one.
The word “potent” should be easy to find in any dictionary.
> I did question you about this trip. How is there a command-hierarchy > in a distributed system? Emmanuel, this one appears completely bonkers > to me.
There is no command-hierarchy defined by the system. But users can define a command-hierarchy if they want to.
> Communication and command are two different things.
Command require and can be defined by communication.
> Your argument here is dependent on there being no need for top > administrators – completely ‘horizontal’ administration. This hasn’t > been established.
I don’t care about it and “parlement” doesn’t care about it. “Parlement” can be used by its users to define whatever they want, including a hierarchy.
> I am a theoretician, so I may understand things that you don’t, and > therefore ‘care’ about them.
Arrogant and unfounded. A surlemming who is merely an elitist prick.
> > Not only that, but no one here will ever code your project. > > If someone doesn’t want to serve humanity, that is their problem. > I’ll code it if I have to. Because of its superior theoretical basis, > it will whup V-V-V.
Great. It’s always fun to observe. Do point us to your subversion repository.
> > You are a kid playing alone. Stop with your attitude please, and try > > to join the rest of the world. > > I am a part of the world because I follow the rule structures that > have been established by the world. Because of your violations of > these rules, you have more of an attitude than me.
Please, do ask around about your attitude. It’s easy to confirm or infirm.
I DON’T CARE ABOUT YOUR GAMES.
> Did you see my “Proof of Lemmingism” post? > Well, is it TRUE?
Don’t you see how arrogant and judgmental you appear?
echarp – http://leparlement.org
+1
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> > The comparison was for the recieved inputs from the individual voter: > > V-V-V – voter chooses a delegate OR an issue position > > SD2-S – voter chooses delegate(s) OR, delegate(s)-AND-issue position.
>ec: Once more, please, repeat after me: users can vote and delegate at the > same time on the same issue. But the direct vote overrides the > delegation.
-M: I did say ‘recieved inputs’ , meaning that I am looking downstream of the override.
At that point, the centrality algorithm recieves only an issue vote OR a delegate vote. This is the point of action, and therefore the point most fruitful for comparison.[…] > > > Because as you yourself agreed, direct expression is more potent > > > than indirect one.
> > What is more ‘potent’(whatever-the-fuck that is supposed to mean), > > direct expression OR, direct expression-and-indirect expression? By > > your convoluted logic my way still should be better.
>ec: It’s not convoluted, and you accepted it: direct expression is more > meaningful than indirect one.
-M: Maybe more meaningful is some contexts, and SD2-S does measure it. And I still asked: “What is more ‘potent’, direct expression OR, direct expression-and-indirect expression?” Well?
>ec: The word “potent” should be easy to find in any dictionary.
-M: This is a strange word for the context.
> > I did question you about this trip. How is there a command-hierarchy > > in a distributed system? Emmanuel, this one appears completely bonkers > > to me.
>ec: There is no command-hierarchy defined by the system. But users can define a command-hierarchy if they want to.
-M: Is there a hierarchal initial condition for a snowballing into more elaborate hierarchies? An example would be to have a popular vote to have SD2-S.
DD is the initial hierarchal condition here.But if its just DD, then you aren’t coming up with anything new.
> > Communication and command are two different things.
>ec: Command require and can be defined by communication.
-M: No, command needs to be defined by centrality algorithms with thresholds.
This is atleast DD with 50%+1. I did tell you that I was a theoretican.Communication only relates to individual inputs.
> > Your argument here is dependent on there being no need for top > > administrators – completely ‘horizontal’ administration. This hasn’t > > been established.
>ec: I don’t care about it and “parlement” doesn’t care about it. “Parlement” > can be used by its users to define whatever they want, including a > hierarchy.
-M: Again, there still needs to be a pre-defined hierarchal initial condition.
> > I am a theoretician, so I may understand things that you don’t, and > > therefore ‘care’ about them.
>ec: Arrogant and unfounded.
-M: Au contraire.
>ec: A surlemming who is merely an elitist prick.
-M: It doesn’t serve humanity to disrespect those who actually know what they are talking about. You have attitude problems.
> > > Not only that, but no one here will ever code your project.
> > If someone doesn’t want to serve humanity, that is their problem. > > I’ll code it if I have to. Because of its superior theoretical basis, > > it will whup V-V-V.
>ec: Great. It’s always fun to observe. Do point us to your subversion repository.
-M: SD2-S will get coded, probably in Ruby.
> > > You are a kid playing alone. Stop with your attitude please, and try > > > to join the rest of the world.
> > I am a part of the world because I follow the rule structures that > > have been established by the world. Because of your violations of > > these rules, you have more of an attitude than me.
>ec: Please, do ask around about your attitude. It’s easy to confirm or > infirm. I DON’T CARE ABOUT YOUR GAMES.
-M: Then you don’t care about established and proven rule structures. This makes you arrogant and a deviant. Maybe you should join rest of the world.
> > Did you see my “Proof of Lemmingism” post? > > Well, is it TRUE?
>ec: Don’t you see how arrogant and judgmental you appear?
-M: I am asking you about TRUTH, not appearances. Well, is it TRUE? Yes/no?
shanti
Mark, Seattle WA USA
+1
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OK, conversation is over as far as I’m concerned.
It leads nowhere, and illegale asked me to stop it. Fine.
echarp – http://leparlement.org
+1
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At 04:33 PM 9/6/2006, Mark wrote:
> >ec: Sorry, where is coming that “if you need administrators”??? I do not > > need administrators!!! Parlement is a totally decentralized, P2P, > > system! Every one can be an administrator. No top administrator, > no “if you need > > administrators”!!! > >-M: I did question you about this trip. How is there a >command-hierarchy in a distributed system? Emmanuel, this one appears >completely bonkers to me. > >Communication and command are two different things.
Indeed they are. Command, in fact, generally inhibits communication.
FA/DP organizations don’t have command structures, as such. From the AA Traditions, “AA as such ought never be organized, but we may create service boards or committees directly responsible to those they serve.” What does this mean in practice?
An AA meeting does have to decide certain things. It has to decide to pay the rent. It has to decide who is to facilitate meetings. (In AA, this person is called the “Secretary,” though the function is generally as a chair. There is also, typically, a Treasurer, who holds and disburses the meager funds that meetings keep on hand.) If the meeting starts to collect more money than it needs for the rent and to buy publications and coffee (this is about it for AA meeting expenses), it needs to decide what to do with it. So the meeting will either vote to do a thing or will delegate the authority. No commands are involved. The meeting will ask the Treasurer to write a check. The Treasurer can, and being an alcoholic, may quite well say, “Up yours.” Will they sue him? Not likely. The amount of money involved is typically so small that the meeting can raise it by passing the hat once. Or maybe twice. No, they ask him to do it. Usually he will. I knew of a meeting where the Treasurer simply spent the money on her own needs. Of course, that meeting didn’t give her any more money….
Okay, we have an online FA. There is admin, in spite of what EC wrote. Somebody has the keys to the domain. In an FA, that person is a trustee. They are trusted to manage the asset in their hands for the best interests of the group. Can the group command admin to do anything? No. Admin has the keys.
However, admin is “directly responsible” to the members of the FA. What does this mean? It means that, because of the structure of the organization, where people know and have direct contact information for each other, if they don’t like the way that admin is running the group, and admin refuses to recognize a vote of the members, they can simply take their marbles elsewhere. If the meeting is, say, a yahoogroup, they can start another, and those who want to move to the new one will do so, and those who want to stay, will do so, and quite a few will do both. How does this differ from any old mailing list? Well, the members can directly contact each other, either all of them, or at least those who have named proxies in a DP organization. The proxy structure dovetails with the fissionability that is standard for AA meetings. There are no significant assets to fight over. All that a meeting owns is an agreement with the provider of space for a time to meet.
Mature AA members don’t fight over control of meetings. Newcomers can and do. The oldtimers, if they don’t like the way a meeting is run, simply go to a different one, and they quite easily start a new one at the drop of a hat. Or, rather, at the passing of the hat….
The saying in AA is, “All you need to start a new meeting is a resentment and a coffee pot.” It is quite possible that the phenomenally rapid growth of AA (it grew until it essentially saturated its market, within a few years) was due to this ready generation of new meetings. A new meeting means another time and place available.
Okay, so I’m a trustee of an FA, and the FA votes to, say, abandon the FA traditions, in my opinion, in a way that I consider seriously prejudicial, and, perhaps with forged proxies, I suspect, but I can’t or don’t care to prove it. What can I do? Well, I’ve promised in at least one FA that I would probably turn the home page of the FA into a pointer. One prominent link would point to the “original” group, and other links would point to daughter groups. Someone who was referred to the FA would see, in NPOV language, what happened, and would be able to find the groups.
Why would I not simply do what the apparent majority voted for. Well, as a trustee, I’d consider myself responsible to all the members, not just to the majority. If there were any significant minority opposed to the change, their interests would be prejudiced by the simple implementation of it.
But another trustee might do it. The minority can still create its own meeting.
>-M: OK, I see Parlement and Wikis going this way, but I still don’t see >the rank and command hierarchies here. It won’t work without hierarchy.
DP creates the necessary hierarchy. And an FA/DP structure advises those who actually hold the keys. For example, admin at Wikipedia could be an example of the latter.
In AA, the central business is handled by AA World Services, Inc, a nonprofit organization. That organization, by its bylaws, does not accumulate more than a “prudent reserve.” For continued operation, they depend on continued contributions from meetings, usually channeled through intergroups. AAWS is a board-controlled organization. I think the members of the Board are elected at the annual AA Conference, which otherwise is only an advisory body with respect to AAWS. The Conference cannot command AAWS to spend a penny. But, of course, the Conference does represent the membership, the people who actually make the contributions. AAWS will usually follow a Conference consensus. Where the Conference is divided, the AAWS board simply makes its own decisions. The board is legally responsible.
AAWS is prohibited by bylaws, again, from accepting contributions and bequests of more than, I think, $1000. The system is specifically designed to keep AAWS “directly responsible” to the membership of AA, without being controlled by the membership.
And, it seems, it has worked quite well. Bill Wilson, himself, had bitter disputes with the board, though it seems it worked out in the end. He later described his own anger at the board as being on a “dry drunk.”
>-M: Lemming = one who is willfully contradictory.
That is not a lemming. That is an anti-lemming. Not necessarily better, by the way. Lemmings are not contradictory, they avoid conflict. They “go with the flow.”
+1
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At 03:41 PM 9/5/2006, Mark wrote: >-M: ‘of course’ – again, why the override? Why not let the voter decide >if there is going to be an override or not? Maybe the voter wants both >a direct vote and more than one delegate. SD2-S allows for this. How is >your way better?
Indeed, why not? The question is whether or not a coded solution is necessary to implement such choice.
If we have a very simple proxy list (one proxy per member), and we have voting records, that is, we know who voted and how, then any analyst can determine
(1) the direct vote. This is generally automatic with, say, yahoogroups voting. Note that this direct vote is what is already generally available. (2) the expanded proxy vote. This can be done by comparing the vote record with the proxy list. The algorithms which can do so are simple, the core of the process, in its simplest form, would be that where a member has not voted, the member’s vote is added with the vote of his or her proxy; if his or her proxy has not voted, the chain of proxies up the tree is examined until an actual voter is found, and the member’s virtual vote is determined in this way. If no voting proxy has been found, the member is in a loop or an inactive branch, and the member may be notified. This notification can be done by any privileged member, that is, any member entrusted with the actual membership list.
So, if the member wants an override, in this simple system, the member merely votes. And if the member does not want an override, the member does not vote. Either the member wants analysts to consider the member’s vote in a result, or not. If not, the member’s vote is dicta, meaningless.
I presume that voting results would appear in stages. However, the essence of the FA/DP systems we envision are that they do not generate excess traffic for members. Many members may not want to be notified of every vote. If we are thinking of a single organization, as many of us do, we often imagine active members and members who would want to know everything going on. But this becomes impossible when there are hundreds of organizations that a member might belong to.
Some would set up a single, massive organization, and then members would participate in issue forums. This is really equivalent to a set of distinct organizations sharing certain central resources. However, independent organizations can already share central resources.
If the relatively complex systems being proposed actually exist and are operational, I’d be happy to see them, indeed I am eager to do so. But I’d personally invest my coding resources — and conceptual resources — in the very simplest systems first. From our experience with these, I would then move to more complex systems, the bells and whistles, so to speak, or even to crucial features that were not possible with the initial simplicity.
Simple DP, through a proxy list, available for analysis, will serve quite well, I expect, in organizations with the purpose of communication and voluntary coordination and cooperation, and specifically in the FA context, where votes do not directly move power. Once power is moved, the control mechanisms become crucial. And we really don’t know the hazards.
As the members of FA/DP organizations increasingly become involved in power and control structures, they will bring with them an experience with DP, as well as of how possible it is to find consensus when the structures encourage and allow it. And at that time, we will have much more knowledge about what works and what does not and what is necessary and what is not.
Complexity in communication systems is a double-edged sword. It can increase utility, but it also increases the number of possible failure modes. It is generally good engineering practice to seek the simplest possible functional systems and to be cautious about complicating them. Every added component, unless the design is very careful, adds increased risk of failure.
Now, I just wrote a relatively long post, in answer to a simple question. The question was not directed at me, but at someone else who is, from what I’ve seen, thinking very much along the same lines as I have. A briefer answer is that what was called “your way” is better because it is simpler. In the absence of demonstrated necessity for the complications suggested, simplicity is a commonly-recognized engineering goal. And engineers who don’t understand that find failure in the market, I’ve seen it again and again. Even if, from their perhaps obsessive point of view, their way was “better.”
I know one RF engineer who is as picky as one can imagine. Now, RF engineering is complex, and, as a support engineer, I expect to see, shall we say, unusual requests. But the pickiness goes far beyond the ultimate customer’s design goal. The documentation must be just so. The parts used must be cost-optimized to the last penny. None of these things are wrong, in themselves, indeed, they can be quite important. But if the job is not ready in time because less consequential aspects of the design require further work to satisfy the engineer’s artificially exacting requirements…. the whole project was wasted. Striking the proper balance is a crucial skill for an engineer. Without it, engineers tend to be isolated dreamers, wondering why the world is not building their castles. Their very perfect castles. Better than anyone else’s.
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At 03:41 PM 9/5/2006, Mark wrote: >-M: Unlimited depth – like PageRank. >But I notice that it is only one delegate per voter.
Mark assumed this, it was not stated. In fact, what was stated implied one delegate per issue. I’m not sure that was meant.
I have assumed that in an FA/DP society, that is, a society which was extensively making use of FA/DP concepts, an individual might efficiently and productively belong to many of organizations, perhaps hundreds of them. Not only might they have a single proxy in each one of these, but they might have more than one in a given organizations.
I’m proposing that organizations set up data structures that can be analyzed flexibly. The basic data structures, the simplest ones, would be a proxy file plus vote files. Then, to be sure, there may be tools to analyze these files. If people in an organization find it useful, there can be more than one proxy file.
It is also possible to build systems that will assign proxies based on some set of criteria. However, my concern is that such assigned proxies, with present technology, would not be particularly likely to create the personal, bidirectional connections that DP, as we foresee it, should create.
That is, you might build information-filtering systems that would function better than what we have currently, but
information-filtering is only one aspect of DP. The relationships of trust are really the core. If you are inclined to trust a machine to tell you whom to trust, fine. I’m not….>Again, because there is only one, there is no ability to fork around >dead ends and loops. This creates instabilities and is overly >centralized compared with having multiple proxies. Well, what is your >response?
Again, the “only one” is for the simplest system, in an FA. In an FA, there is no need to formally “fork around” dead ends and loops. At most, what is needed is to inform loop members, for example, that they are in a loop. (If everyone assigns a proxy, there are no dead ends. But there can be, indeed there must be, loops.)
The problem with loops and dead ends is the same problem: under certain conditions, they can result in a member not being represented. In my view, the simplest and safest way to deal with this is to inform the member who is not being represented. As to alternate proxies, anybody is free to propose that another field be added to the proxy list. If proxy A does not vote, then proxy B.
My opinion is that smaller organizations won’t need this. DP creates, however, in theory, organizations that can change rapidly. I don’t see DP organizations developing the kind of inertia that I’ve described so many times that it has come to be called the Lomax effect by some.
So if there is a need for alternate proxies, not a problem, it can be easily done. Unless everything is written into the basic code for the main communications structure of the organization. Which is why I want analysis to be distributed. In FAs, we can get away with this, particularly because the use of the information is distributed. In governments, the usage is centralized, so the exact mechanism of analysis becomes crucial.
> >ec: One can change anytime his actions. A direct vote will, of > course, override an indirect delegation. > >-M: ‘of course’ – again, why the override?
Because the proxy is two things. The proxy is, for himself or herself, a free actor. But in casting proxy votes, the proxy is only a servant of the voter. The voter clearly has the authority to override any decision of the proxy. Or what we have is not a proxy, it is an assigned representative, or a representative who was at one time chosen, but who now has assumed authority superior to that of the client.
Mark may want this, may consider that in some way it will institutionalize government by the elite, but I won’t buy it, and, indeed, I wouldn’t buy any system that did not allow such an override. Consider that my free choice, a personal one. And I might very well be buying a system.
I would not buy stock in a corporation that did not allow me to personally vote that stock, that required me to choose a proxy, in advance, and that then barred me from voting because I had chosen a proxy. It’s not common law, it is not, indeed, that anyone with resources and choices would accept.
> Why not let the voter decide >if there is going to be an override or not? Maybe the voter wants both >a direct vote and more than one delegate. SD2-S allows for this. How is >your way better?
Huh? “Let the voter decide if there is going to be an override or not?” Doesn’t the voter decide this by voting? If I want my proxy’s vote to stand, why do I bother voting directly? It’s work, you know. I’ll only vote if I consider myself competent. And who is to say who is more competent, me or my proxy?
I’ll tell you. I am. Legally. That is, I have the right to choose to act directly or to assign my rights to a proxy. This is common law, it’s been that way for centuries. And now Mark comes and asks us why. No, he should justify why not, since he is proposing a serious change to the status quo regarding proxy voting.
Of course, he does not use the term proxy…. which is correct. He is not apparently talking about proxies, but about something else that merely resembles a proxy in some way.
>-M: SD2-Smartocracy offers: >1. general trustees and/or >2. issue position and/or >3. specific delegates and/or >4. decision thresholds and/or >5. deliberation thresholds > >The only two that are mutually exclusive are #1 and #3. >This yields about 20 different combination possibilities for the voter. >How is your way better?
That’s easy. Basic DP offers two choices to the voter: participate or delegate. If you delegate, you choose one person to represent you (to an organization, meeting, special topic or issue, if you want, but what is fundamental is: pick the person in this organization whom you trust most. If that person is too busy, that person will make a recommendation to you as to who would be a good proxy. Follow that unless you’ve got a good reason not to. After all, if you trust the proxy, in a delegable proxy system, you are effectively trusting whomever the proxy trusts….)
Simple. This simplicity is what would make it practical to participate in hundreds, maybe even in thousands of organizations.
But, once again, if the members of an organization find that they need the additional complexity, it can be easily done. The matter of decision threshholds, I commend Mark for mentioning it, but time does not allow full discussion of it.
My view is that the majority in any meeting has the right of decision, but that a wise majority will seek broader consensus, if it cares about the unity of the organization. In an FA, it becomes moot, because the various factions that may exist may form and act through caucuses without any consent from anyone else. Seeking broader consensus is voluntary. The only coercion is the natural one: if you act before you gain broad consensus, you may end up wasting your efforts. A two-thirds majority with an equally determined one-third in opposition ends up with a vector sum of one-third, compared to near-unity for substantial consensus. Consensus is powerful.
But institutionalized rules requiring supermajorities, and I’ve certainly worked in plenty of organizations that had them, generally lead to forms of minority rule, where the status quo favors a minority. It would take elaborate systems to get around this, and it is much simpler to recognize the basic right of a majority to take action when it sees the time ripe for it. And democratic societies generally recognize this.
Decision threshholds are a matter of meeting rules, and the common Robert’s Rules are excellent as a default set…..
> >ec: Some differences: > > – no rank or other such silly concepts > >-M: Delegates all have differing voting power relative to one another. >This is rank whether it is called ‘rank’ or not. (I have said this >before, and this is an uncontested point of mine.)
I’ve used the term “proxy rank” to refer to the relative voting strength of proxies. Because, in the systems I’m considering, the actual vote of a proxy is not an independent variable, it depends on who else votes, the vote count on which proxy rank is based, as I’ve used the term, would refer to the number of votes which would be counted for a proxy if only the proxy voted. Because of loops, there is a little bit of manipulation needed to get a reasonable ranking (otherwise all members of loops would have the same rank) — but I won’t go into that here.
Proxy rank is one means of determining the right of participation in meetings. However, it is not the only one. Still, a system which automatically calculates proxy rank could be used to provide automatic provision of posting rights in a meeting-list. I’d guess that this is what Mark is talking about.
I do consider that communications restrictions are essential to the scalability of any democratic system. Otherwise the noise becomes overwhelming. However, I’d leave to each meeting (physical, mailing list, forum) what restrictions are appropriate. Small meetings need none.
FA/DP systems would be direct democracies in the sense that the right to vote is not alienated from the members (there is a double protection because votes don’t bind power; that is, an FA cannot command a member to do anything. Nor does it collect significant assets and spend them by majority vote, so it can’t spend the funds contributed by a member without that member’s consent.) However, direct democracies break down when the scale gets large — this is the problem we are all trying to solve, I think — and this makes the restriction of communication essential. To say it simply, if everyone can speak to everyone, almost nobody will hear anybody. There has to be a means of limiting the traffic. Filtering, in a word. In a DP system, the proxy is the filter.
And access to high-level meetings is through proxies. But voting is not so restricted, so, quite obviously, whatever constraints exist on communication to that meeting must be acceptable to, at least, the majority. And in an FA, if members don’t like that, they are totally free to form another meeting without such restrictions. If there are very many of them, I think they will soon realize their own foolishness….
>Does anyone have a better way?
Sure. Convince one person here that your proposals are best, and then let that person, shall we say, second your motion…. Simply proclaiming that your way is best isn’t going to cut it. Two people arguing for it is far more persuasive.
It might be best. I’m not arguing against it. But I’m far short of convinced that it is what we want now!
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