Serge wrote:
> Hi Mark, Thanks for the screenshot.[…] As for your approach, this goes way further as you are looking it seems at a whole overhaul of the legislative power,…
-M: I am seeking to reform organizational methods in general, whether or not the organization is political. I am fond of this method being applied to educational institutions.
>S:… and integrating direct democracy with a dose of representative democracy,…
-M: The only DD that SD2-Smartocracy has is with delaying decisions
that the voters may be uneasy about. A decision can proceed with only
40% approval by default.
Decisions are still made entirely by RD.
>S: …thus guaranteeing necessary decisions aren’t stalled by lack of > participation, but also that votes without sufficient participation > can’t be hijacked by special interest. Save for the delegating details, the weighing of representation and direct democracy through such a system seems very reasonnable, and may > help overcome the argument that without representation nothing would ever happen, as detractors of any form of more direct democracy would probably say.
-M: :-)
>S: So based on your model I wouldn’t actually have serious grounds to
> propose major changes. I have one main issue with the default
> representative though, and one other remark. So, to take the screenshot
> again, say in the context of a town council with 20 traditionally
> elected councillors:
> Name: [ X, voting citizen of city Y
> - Representative Side
> Mandatory Representatives(2):
> [(1)Councillor 5, (2)Councillor 16]
> - default seems potentially dangerous as it could divert half my
> represented voting power to someone I actually oppose
-M: Then fuck’n vote for a rep! :-)
The default is just a convienience for those who don’t know the
players.
And the algorithm makes ALL voters candidates, so the voter has lots of
choices.
Also the algorithm would never give default power to the top player, so
it wouldn’t feed any rank entrenchments.
> Optional Representatives(upto 8): > _______(blank)__________] > — could be useful but not absolutely needed, optional status thus > seems logical
-M: Yes, I think that enough people would vote for the delegate/specialists that it would divert decision rank away from trustee/generalists.
> Direct voting side:
> Issue X
> Issue proxy(defaults to representatives if no delegate is selected.)
> - ok
> [__Trusted other voting citizen of city Y]
> Position: yes[x], deliberate[ ], no[ ]
> – don’t see the interest of this, either you do have a position and you
> can vote yourself, either you don’t and you should then trust your
> proxy’s judgement / maybe I misunderstand the meaning of this line
-M: Its not proxy judgement or personal judgement, its proxy judgement and personal judgement, so the position that one takes gets counted as the popular vote, and it gets counted as the proxy vote when someone else selects the voter.
> Optional additional delegates(4)_(blank)______] > – could be useful on complicated issues such as budget, but again > probably not necessay in many cases, so optional status seems > appropriate > Decision threshold, PageRank (>50%-70%) [60%(default)] > AND Popular vote (>35%-50%) [40%(default)] > – makes sense > Decision Number 5(min number) + 0%-85% of voting population > [50%(default)] > – makes sense > Also could you maybe point me to a couple articles/sources explaining > how a centrality algorithm is elaborated? You seem to identify it as > the single most important element in such a system, so I’d like to > understand this better (I am not a programmer but I do have a > scientific background).
-M: All voting in democracy is processed with a centrality algorithm. With majoritarian democracy, this algorithm is counting, also called ‘in-degree’.
The problem with this algorithm is that it is only one layer deep: A votes for B.
By contrast, with PageRank, this has unlimited depth:
A>B>C>D>E…, or even with forks A>B-and-C >D,
PageRank can even handle loops.
The idea here us to use a complex and non-arbitrary algorithm to do most of the work.
>S: Tried to find some info on centrality > algorithms and stumbled accross http://www.truthmapping.com/ so I > assume you may be linked to that as it discusses SD2. No time to read > through it yet, but I see there are a number of critiques/rebuttal etc > there, and I like the way the logical process is defined and each step > analyzed, as well as how the premises of the reasonning are identified > – so will definitly go and read, if only to have a closer look at the > way the dissection of logic is done.
-M: I posted that, but haven’t cleaned it up in a while.
Here is the algorithm explained:
http://www.webworkshop.net/pagerank.html
shanti
Mark, Seattle WA USA
+1
Hey,
Thanks for the link.
I must be missing somthing though. At one point you state:
Decisions are still made entirely by RD
and then
-M: Its not proxy judgement or personal judgement, its proxy judgement and personal judgement, so the position that one takes gets counted as the popular vote, and it gets counted as the proxy vote when someone else selects the voter.
The second statement seems to imply that popular voting, ie DD, is playing a role (which is what I understood from your screenshot), as opposed to what the first statement is suggesting. Could you clear this? In the case of someone selecting a voter that has already cast a vote as his proxy, isn’t it similar in effect as direct voting? Feel free to point me to an old post if this has been discussed before.
As a remark, it seems predictable enough that with the sheer number of possible issues, very few people would be actively involved with an issue and not be representing other voters as proxies for that issue. By the same token, if one doesn’t follow debates, it seems unlikely he would have any opinion beyond what his proxy filters down and advises. Why not then allow direct voting? Proxies do have to start somewhere..
Regards,
Serge
+1
>S: Hey, Thanks for the link. I must be missing somthing though. At one point you state: Decisions are still made entirely by RD and then:
> “-M: Its not proxy judgement or personal judgement, its proxy > judgement and personal judgement, so the position that one takes gets > counted as the popular vote, and it gets counted as the proxy vote when > someone else selects the voter.”
>S: The second statement seems to imply that popular voting, ie DD, is > playing a role (which is what I understood from your screenshot), as > opposed to what the first statement is suggesting. Could you clear > this? In the case of someone selecting a voter that has already cast a > vote as his proxy, isn’t it similar in effect as direct voting? Feel > free to point me to an old post if this has been discussed before.
-M: The screenshot/ballot provides for a DD-like input, and this data gets used:
>S: As a remark, it seems predictable enough that with the sheer number of > possible issues, very few people would be actively involved with an > issue and not be representing other voters as proxies for that issue.
-M: Thats why I would have numerical thresholds for issues also.
>S: By the same token, if one doesn’t follow debates, it seems unlikely he > would have any opinion beyond what his proxy filters down and advises.
-M: Then the proxies’s opinions are needed.
>S: Why not then allow direct voting? Proxies do have to start somewhere..
-M: What is direct voting? How it is done, or how it is counted?
With SD2-S, the direct vote is always allowed, and it is always counted atleast for deliberation purposes.
shanti
Mark, Seattle WA USA
+1
Hey,
I guess I should have started by asking this instead. Do you have a definition document of some kind of SD2-S as a system? Instead of asking fragmentory questions and getting logically fragmentary answers, it’d probably be a better starting point. I have to say I am confused as to the thresholds, whether it’s all functionning in parallel or as aggregates, whether you actually expect 40% of the whole voting population to cast a direct vote on each issue – even if through a position through proxy, etc etc etc. And direct voting is a voter directly casting his vote to be counted on a given proposal/issue.
Regards,
Serge
+1
>S: I guess I should have started by asking this instead. Do you have a > definition document of some kind of SD2-S as a system?
-M: Good question. I just now looked and the closest thing to
documentation is my ‘screenshot’ posts. I do have a Yahoo group:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/sd-2/
and my constraints for SD2 as an umbrella system are here.
But this is just for selecting generalist/trustees/directors, SD2-S is
much more sophisticated.
To understand SD2-S, look at the screenshot, and understand the default
hierarchy:
If specialists are not selected by the voter for an issue, then the
previous generalist/trustees are defaulted to.
>S: […]whether you actually expect 40% of the whole voting > population to cast a direct vote on each issue – …
-M: No, 40% of whoever votes, by popular vote. A majority isn’t needed as long as the default 60% of PageRanked proxy vote is met.
>S:…even if through a position through proxy, etc etc etc.
-M: And the representitive vote is determinned by PageRank – this is the proxy vote, and this needs 60% by default.
>S: And direct voting is a voter directly casting his vote to be counted on a given proposal/issue.
-M: OK, ‘to be counted’ , which does what? With SD2-S, this either triggers deliberation thresholds or not.
shanti
Mark, Seattle WA USA
+1