[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives

Magnus — 2006-10-24 12:18:10+0200

[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives

echarp — 2006-10-24 10:44:39+0200

> > But, during the vote, any single point of failure ought to be > > removed to strengthen the whole thing. Consensus is the tool of > > choice to agree on what the expressed decisions are (as is currently > > the case). > > Just like to add that what possibilities and rights a bord should have > ofcourse have to very clearly specified and it shall only be more or > less technical issues about the voting process in relation to the > design intent, nothing more.

The voting system has to be defined for the voters to cast their vote. Anybody willing should be able to follow that through and, with the votes database, be able to come to the correct results.

The voting procedure should be defined… democratically! ;)

> So his has to be written clearly in a regulation document, otherwise > this board soon enough will contain old politicians seeing a way of > preserving their own power instead of acting simple clerks, working > more as servants to the voters.

Read more… / Lire plus…

Coming to a consensus is a matter of technicality. Otherwise it is open to all sorts of other matters.

That consensus should become a widespread habit, where many will check all results, and media would report their own. Then it’s a matter of reputation and outcomes.

echarp – http://leparlement.org/fr

[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives

echarp — 2006-10-24 10:29:42+0200

> > > You could use a selected board for that if you want to :) > > See?

Of course you could, but it is bad engineering.

> > Or try to come to a consensus. > > > > As already happens in all voting offices. > > Is it? And what even if so, if we call a discussion of a badly written > or torn ballot a “software problem”, isn’t the people in that voting > office a trusted board?

They are not a trusted board.

Read more… / Lire plus…

They are all willing people and parties. They reach a consensus.

echarp – http://leparlement.org

[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives

Magnus — 2006-10-24 10:24:20+0200

>Basically, we don’t know what happens after democratic decisions are taken. Board, government, administrators, commission.

It is open to all possibilities.

But, during the vote, any single point of failure ought to be removed to
strengthen the whole thing. Consensus is the tool of choice to agree on

Read more… / Lire plus…

what the expressed decisions are (as is currently the case).

-Just like to add that what possibilities and rights a bord should have ofcourse have to very clearly specified and it shall only be more or less technical issues about the voting process in relation to the design intent, nothing more.
So his has to be written clearly in a regulation document, otherwise this board soon enough will contain old politicians seeing a way of preserving their own power instead of acting simple clerks, working more as servants to the voters.

[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives

echarp — 2006-10-24 10:15:19+0200

> If what you are building is a power structure, as distinct from a > corruption-immune system like FA/DP — which maintains its relative > immunity by leaving nearly all power at the member level — then you > will almost certainly need a board, and officers. Yes, this is a > possible failure point, no doubt about that, but the problems with > boards happen when the members are not actively involved and there is > no means for a member recognizing the problem to effectively and > efficiently communicate with the rest of the members, the board can block it.

Basically, we don’t know what happens after democratic decisions are taken. Board, government, administrators, commission.

It is open to all possibilities.

But, during the vote, any single point of failure ought to be removed to strengthen the whole thing. Consensus is the tool of choice to agree on what the expressed decisions are (as is currently the case).

echarp – http://leparlement.org

[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives

Magnus — 2006-10-24 01:07:23+0200

>So, if we imagine some community that goes this way, than we have to understand there is some commonly trusted body which states that someones virtual entity present rl person in that community. That commonly trusted body is by default non TOP. If people agree to that, than I have to acklaim that either.

-No, It’s only a thing between you and the computer(s). This secret connection can be a pair of keys, only known by you, not by a board or something.
But for all non-delegates, I think secret connections between the cast ballots and the personal account is enough.
I only see need for VID when a delegate want the option of voting differently than as delegate, maybe when the delegation is not only one person but a party or Greenpeace or so. Teh VId would be used for the delegating vote casting, and the personal for personal vote casting.

[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives

Magnus — 2006-10-24 00:58:53+0200

Ofcourse!

[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives

Magnus — 2006-10-24 00:57:42+0200

>> You could use a selected board for that if you want to :)

-See?

>Or try to come to a consensus.

As already happens in all voting offices.

-Is it? And what even if so, if we call a discussion of a badly written or torn ballot a “software problem”, isn’t the people in that voting office a trusted board?

[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives

echarp — 2006-10-23 23:27:03+0200

On Mon, Oct 23, 2006 at 03:19:12PM +0200, Serge wrote:

> I think your disagreement (echard and Magnus) stems from the voting > methods you advocate so that in essence I believe your arguments > actually complement each other.

Hopefully.

> In the case of AD’s continous voting approach, there is a need for a > much more specific piece of soft to be integrated in the system as it > determines the closing of a vote dynamically.

Read more… / Lire plus…

I also advocate continuous voting. But then I don’t consider that votes need to be closed.

> This need for integration and crosstalk is absent from echarp’s > approach as he is thinking of vote verification after the fact (if I > am understanding both your arguments correctly), which indeed could be > done with something as simple as an excel spreadsheet populated with > the voting results.

“After” is verifiability. But it can and should occur at all time, in real time.

With luck every voter could be able to look up the results on different nodes, and see if his personal votes are correctly accounted for.

> One could imagine that different counting pieces of code could be > certified by delegates handling voting methods in the system > (trustworthiness solved, Magnus?) and used in parallel so as to ensure > that should one counting system fail or be compromised, other systems > may show the discrepancy and raise a red flag (satisfying mode of > operation, echarp?).

The mode of operation… I don’t have anything precise in mind. The point is just to have as many verification nodes as possible, then a consensus to define the result.

If that was to work properly, that system would organise in real time and wouldn’t need anything formal.

> This way you would have the certification needed for results to be > trustworthy while enjoying the added security of having several > counting options, discrepancies in which would be a reasonnable basis > for investigation into a possible manipulation or irregularity.

Investigation of course, and deliberation, conviction. Using computers and the simplest procedures possible, it should be possible to quickly determine what went wrong and how to correct it.

> Best regards, > > Serge

Sincèrement

echarp – http://leparlement.org/security

[top-politics] Re: Software initiatives

echarp — 2006-10-23 17:40:24+0200

On Mon, Oct 23, 2006 at 05:36:54PM +0200, ketty wrote:

> On 10/23/06, MG <magnusgus@gmail.com> wrote: > > But how shall a two result situation be handled when we have an > > important vote? > > And who will handle it? > > You could use a selected board for that if you want to :)

Or try to come to a consensus.

As already happens in all voting offices.

echarp – http://leparlement.org/security